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RECENT DECISIONS
ADM]RxALTY-Carriage of Goods by Sea Act-Ship Mortgage Act-Doc-
trine of seaworthiness expanded to include financial responsibility of a
carrier.
Morrisey v. S.S. A. & J. Faith, 252 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
Libelant, the Republic of Pakistan, contracted for the shipment of cer-
tain cargo with Pacific Seafarer's, Inc., owner of the S.S. A. & I. Faith,
and paid the freight charges in advance. It did so at a time when the
vessel owner was on the brink of hopeless insolvency. The prepaid
freights were distributed among the ship's creditors in an attempt to
satisfy their growing impatience. Inevitably, however, the creditors filed
libels against the Faith and she was seized and held for judicial sale.1
Grace Lines, Ltd., who was also the holder of the preferred ship mortgage,
was the purchaser at the sale2 and is now the respondent in this action by
libelant for recovery of its prepaid freights.3 Libelant contends that its
claim is entitled to priority over Grace Line's preferred ship mortgage
because the solicitation and acceptance by the shipowner of the prepaid
freights when imminent seizure was foreseeable was a breach of the
owner's duty under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act to use due dili-
gence to provide a seaworthy vessel fit to perform its voyage. 4 By em-
phasizing the commission of a tort by the shipowner, libelant will recover
a greater share of its prepaid freights than it would if it merely sued in
contract.5 Respondent, on the other hand, argues that any breach of its
1. Forty-one libels were filed against the Faith for unpaid wages, maritime injury,
breach of contract, breach of employment obligation and failure to pay suppliers and mari-
time service companies. The court appointed a Master Commissioner to assist in determining
the validity and priority of the respective liens. Grace Lines, Ltd. appeals from the Com-
missioner's decision.
2. Grace Lines, Ltd. was the highest bidder at $350,000. It assumed the obligation and
cost of completing the voyage.
3. Other parties to this consolidated libel proceeding were before this court in 1964 in
an action for a share in certain freight receipts paid when respondent completed the voyage.
The court denied relief to libelant stevedoring companies and suppliers on the ground that
their prior liens against the vessel were extinguished by the judicial sale. Morrisey v. S.S.
A. & J. Faith, 238 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
4. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(1a)
(1964).
5. This is so because the Ship Mortgage Act allows a lien for damages arising out of
tort to gain priority over the preferred ship mortgage. The Ship Mortgage Act, § 30(m),
41 Stat. 1004 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 953(a) (1964). The Ship Mortgage Act represented legis-
lation adopted by Congress to overcome the decision in Bogart v. The John Jay, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 399 (1854), which held that a mortgage on a ship was not a maritime contract
and was not within admiralty jurisdiction, thus preventing the mortgagee from suing in
admiralty. Port Welcome Cruises, Inc. v. S.S. Bay Belle, 215 F.Supp. 72 (D.C. Md. 1963).
It also was intended to establish sound security in favor of loans to shipowners, First
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duty under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act to provide a seaworthy
vessel is excused under that section of the Act exempting the owner when
delay is due to "seizure under legal process." 6 Held, for libelant; a vessel
is unseaworthy when the vessel owner leaves the ship unprotected against
foreseeable seizure by creditors, thereby giving rise to an action in tort
and allowing the claim for prepaid freight to gain priority over the pre-
ferred ship mortgagee.
After deciding that the Faith was a common carrier with all the at-
tendent obligations to the public,7 the Chief Judge of the District Court
disposed of the respondent's contention that it was excused from liability
for seizure by legal process. The court subscribed to the view espoused
by Gilmore and Black in their treatise on Admiralty that it was the better
view that the exemption should not be granted when the owner is the
cause of the seizure.8 The court also supported this position by resorting
to an analysis of the purpose of this exemption. "The purpose," it said,
"is to excuse ships and their owners from underwriting damage sustained
by unexpected delays which the owner can neither avoid, anticipate nor
prevent."9 From this analysis and from the fact that it has been held
that the other exemptions of the Act are not available as a defense when
the vessel owner is at fault,1" the court's conclusion that the exemption
cannot be invoked by respondent rests on sound foundations.
The court then turned its attention to libelant's argument that the
acceptance of the prepaid freights by the vessel owner violated his duty
to use due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship. "The connotative
ambit," it said, "of the term 'seaworthy' has expanded concentrically in
direct proportion to the number of occasions upon which courts have been
called upon to interpret it."'1 With this trend established, Judge Connell
then decided that seaworthiness "should not be limited to merely the
physical facilities" of a ship but should also include its financial condi-
tion.'2 In support, the court reasoned that seaworthiness "connotes simply
Suffolk Nat'l Bank of Huntington v. The Air Brant, 125 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1954), and
to promote ship financing by affording substantial security to investors, Chemical Bank
New York Trust Co. v. Steamship Westhampton, 358 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1965). For a
discussion of the soundness of ship mortgages, see Gyory, Security at Sea: A Review of
the Preferred Ship Mortgage, 31 FORDHAm L. REV. 231 (1962).
6. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, § 4(g), 49 Stat. 1210 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2g)
(1964).
7. 252 F. Supp. 56-57 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
8. GIi. oRE & BLACK, THE LAW oF ADMHRALTY 143 (1957), which lists three cases on
the subject, two of which were decided by the same judge.
9. 252 F. Supp. 58 (NJ). Ohio 1965).
10. The exemption for damage from an act of God is not available if the carrier was
negligent in failing to guard against the natural event claimed to be the act of God. Mamiye
Bros. v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
11. 252 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
12 Ibid.
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lem.2 3 Congress accepted the recommendation and adopted the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act in 1936 which bound the vessel owner to his present
duty to "exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy."24 The two
Acts differ principally in the areas to which they apply: the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act to foreign commerce 25 and the Harter Act to domestic
commerce unless the parties stipulate that the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act will govern.21 On the whole, however, it has been authoritatively sug-
gested that both Acts contain so many similarities that their differences
can be considered minor and that both "seaworthiness" and "due dili-
gence" mean the same under both Acts.2
The classic definition of "seaworthiness" was laid down by the Su-
preme Court in The Silvia:28 whether the vessel is reasonably fit to carry
the goods which she has undertaken to transport. Since then, the major
area for the operation of the term has been as a seaman's remedy for
maritime injury.29 It is to be noted that in the Morrisey case, the court
dealt with "seaworthiness" as it applies to the carriage of goods, an area
significantly different from the personal injury area." It is not absolutely
clear that the seaworthiness concept in the carriage of goods area has
been expanding to the degree that it has in the personal injury area.3 ,
23. For history and comment on the Hague Rules, see Geary, Carriage of Goods by
Sea, 7 ORE. L. REv. 320 (1928); James, Carriage of Goods by Sea-The Hague Rules, 74
U. PA. L. REv. 672 (1926); Note, 23 VA. L. REV. 590 (1937).
24. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, § 3(2), 49 Stat. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §
1303(la) (1964).
25. § 1207, 49 Stat. (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1964).
26. The Vale Royal, 51 F. Supp. 412 (D.C. Md. 1943).
27. GnLORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 8, at 127; The Bill, 47 F. Supp. 969 (D.C.
Md. 1942), affirmed 145 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1944); for a comparison of the two Acts see
Note, 27 VA. L. REV. 1078 (1941).
28. 171 U.S. 462 (1898).
29. For an examination of the current state of the seaworthiness doctrine in this area,
see Shields and Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen,
111 U. PA. L. Rav. 1137 (1963); Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness and the Rights of Har-
bor Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381 (1954); Note, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1180 (1966); Note, 4
HOUSTON L. REV. 153 (1966); Note, 61 Micu. L. REV. 982 (1963); Comment, 76 H.aM.
L. REv. 819 (1963); Comment, 9 V=. L. REV. 422 (1964).
30. Seaworthiness in the personal injury area holds the shipowner to an absolute duty,
unlimited by concepts of common-law negligence. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S.
539 (1960). Seaworthiness in the carriage of goods area holds the shipowner to a duty
relaxed by statute to use due diligence. The difference is mainly due to the widely
espoused belief that seamen are "thoughtless and require indulgence; . . . are credulous and
complying; and are easily over reached. . . . They are emphatically wards of ad-
miralty. . . ." Harden v. Gorden, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, 485 (No. 6047 1823). See also, Hudson
Waterways Corp. v. Schneider, 365 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1966). On the other hand,
cargo seaworthiness seems to have been made a less exacting doctrine when the shipping
industry needed room to expand.
31. See Note, 66 COLu"m. L. REV. supra note 29, reviewing the expansion and discussing
conflicting decisions as to whether a failure to allocate an adequate number of crewmen to
perform a particular duty comprises unseaworthiness. See also, Hudson Waterways Corp.
v. Schneider, 365 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1966).
(Vol. 5:191
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a vessel fit to perform as she promises,"' 3 that the obligation for a sea-
worthy ship is imposed so that a shipowner can make a reasonable effort
to furnish a vessel which can complete the voyage for which she solicits
business,'14 and that the foreseeable result of a financially unprotected ship
is the same as one with a physical defect: "interruption or termination
of the voyage."' 5 This conclusion is necessary for the ultimate determina-
tion of the priority of libelant's claim, for it supports the existence of a
tort. In doing so, however, it is necessary to determine whether the court
unnecessarily expanded the seaworthiness doctrine.
"Seaworthiness" as an Admiralty concept .is primarily applicable to
three areas-to the carriage of goods, as here, to a seaman as a remedy
for maritime injury,'6 and to Marine Insurance. 7 It has its foundation
in early history as part of the famous Laws of Oleron requiring the ship-
owner to exercise due diligence to make his vessel seaworthy for the benefit
of the shipper. 8 England developed the doctrine as an implied, absolute
warranty for the benefit of both the shipper and the ship underwriter.' 9
Thereafter, when the shipowners began the practice of placing clauses
in their bills of lading relieving them of their liability for unseaworthiness,
a split developed between the English and American courts. The former
approved these provisions while the latter held them invalid as against
public policy."0 In response to a demand for relief by American shippers,
2
'
Congress passed the Harter Act in 1893 relaxing the standard of care
required to one of due diligence to make the ship seaworthy.2 2 Shortly
after this action, brokers, underwriters and shipowners saw the need for
international uniformity in ocean bills of lading, and, in 1923, the Hague
Rules were recommended to all countries as the solution to this prob-
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Id. at 59.
16. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944);
Carlisle Packing Co. v..Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
17. I PARSONS, MARINE INSURANCE 367-400 (1868).
18. The Laws of Oleron take their name from the Island of Oleron off the French
coast and were supposed to have been compiled under the direction of Eleanor of Acquitine
about 1150 A.D. They have been reprinted as an Appendix to Volume 30 of the Federal
Cases. The Laws of Oleron, 30 Fed. Cas. 1171 et seq.
19. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703). The exceptions
were only for "Acts of God and the enemies of the King."
20. The Jason, 225 U.S. 32 (1912); The Delaware, 161. U.S. 459 (1896); see also
Green, The Harter Act, 16 HARV. L. REv. 157 (1903).
21. The American shippers demanded relief because shipowners in foreign trade inserted
clauses in their bills of lading relieving them of liability for injuries due to the neglect of
their agents. These clauses, while invalid in United States Federal Courts, were valid in
countries to which the vessel was bound, thus placing American shippers at a disadvantage.
Green, supra note 20.
22. The Harter Act, § 3, 27 Stat. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1964).
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The decisions in the cargo carriage area have tended to concentrate on an
evaluation of the physical fitness of a ship to carry, preserve and deliver
her cargo. 2 Included among the ordinary situations have been: defective
compasses,3 protruding conduit pipes34 and defective boilers. 5 Some
courts, however, have held a ship unseaworthy for such situations as im-
proper stowage,8 overloading 7 and open hatches. 8 These decisions ap-
pear to be consonant with the broad test of seaworthiness set forth by
the Supreme Court and generally recognized by courts since that time. 9
In view of this background, the Morrisey court seems to be correct in its
conclusion that the cargo seaworthiness doctrine should include the fi-
nancial responsibility of the vessel owner. Its failure to trace the actual
expansion of the doctrine leaves the court open to some criticism, but,
notwithstanding this lapse, the validity of the general conclusion should
be accepted.
Once the court decided that the Faith was unseaworthy it was not
difficult to give the libelant's claim priority. The court did so by reasoning
that the breach of the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel gives rise to a
cause of action both in tort and contract ° and if in tort, libelant's claim
becomes a preferred maritime lien within that section of the Ship
Mortgage Act that gives priority to a "lien for damages arising out of
tort."'" The existence of a tort-contract action was arrived at by con-
sidering the general consensual duty imposed by law on a common carrier
dealing with the public,4 2 in which situation the Supreme Court had early
stated that such dual remedies in tort and contract exist.43 It has been
suggested that the Supreme Court case so holding has not been followed
by the lower courts, which, when faced with these "hybrid" claims, have
32. Morrisey v. S.S. A. & J. Faith, 252 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
33. The Yungay, 58 F.2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
34. Edmund Weil, Inc. v. American West African Line, Inc., 147 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.
1945).
35. Karobi Lumber Co. v. S.S. Norco, 249 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Ala. 1966).
36. Pioneer Import Corp. v. The Lafcomo, 138 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
Black Diamond Lines, Inc. v. Pioneer Import Corp., 321 U.S. 766 (1944).
37. Andros Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Panama Canal Co., 184 F. Supp. 246 (D.C. Canal
Zone 1960), aff'd, 298 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1962).
38. Middle East Agency, Inc. v. The John B. Waterman, 86 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
39. The Second Circuit has recently declared that "the basic threefold concept of a
sound ship, proper gear and a competent crew has remained unchanged." Waldron v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1966). Even seaworthiness as a
mariner's remedy has been said to be a duty, while absolute, only to furnish a vessel and
appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362
U.S. 539 (1960).
40. 252 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
41. The Ship Mortgage Act, supra note 5.
42. Morrisey v. S.S. A. & J. Faith, 252 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
43. The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113 (1898).
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tended to treat such claims as contractual.44 It has also been suggested
that another case,45 which the Morrisey court cited and which is very
similar to the case at hand in that it allowed the prepaid freight claim to
gain priority in the same manner, is not reputable authority, for it relied
on railroad cases where the contract-tort distinction is procedurally im-
portant and where any determination of lien priorities is substantively
unimportant.46 While this distinction may be accurate, it is not absolutely
certain that this fact alone makes the case unauthoritative, for decision
by analogy is a commonly used device among courts. In any event, the
John G. Stevens still remains good law and its dual cause of action theory
even appears to have been approved by dictum in a later decision of the
Supreme Court. Overall, therefore, the Morrisey court's logic seems
valid; however, before it can be totally approved, its effect on the pre-
ferred ship mortgagee must be examined, for his was supposedly a pre-
ferred security.
The mortgagee has every right to be dismayed at the result reached48
and, unfortunately, the possible alternatives he might follow to avoid
another decision similar to the present one do not offer much hope. He
might require the shipowner to provide financial statements after every
trip, but the shipowner may have already acted irresponsibly. He could
require the shipowner to place a clause in every bill of lading whereby
any shipper would be obligated to waive his claim for prepaid freights if
delivery is not made; we have already seen, however, that American
courts view these clauses with disfavor.49 The mortgagee could possibly
require the shipowner to indemnify him for any tort liens that gain pri-
ority over the mortgagee due to the shipowner's irresponsibility. This
action might, however, adversely affect the shipping industry and prove
impractical if the shipowner, himself, is financially unsound. Statutory re-
form is a possibility but as is too often the situation with these attempts,
Congress may prove to be an insurmountable barrier. The most favorable
course of action may only be to press for a narrow application of the
holding in the Morrisey case for in all probability the exercise of sound
management by the vessel owner would have resulted in a decision for
44. Grr oaa & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 8 at 612.
45. The Henry W. Breyer, 17 F.2d 423 (D.C. Md. 1927). The Morrisey court realized
that it could have merely relied on Breyer in reaching its decision but concluded that it
would not do so because Breyer was decided before the passage of the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act. In view of the similarities between this Act and The Harter Act (see note 6),
it is difficult to understand the court's reluctance.
46. Gn oaE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 8 at 612.
47. Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195 (1932) (dictum). See also, The Pacific
Spruce, I F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Wash. 1932).
48. It has been recognized, however, that the investor in a ship mortgage has a different
kind of risk with possibly a slightly greater litigation factor. Gyory, 31 FoRanHA L. REV.
supra note 5.
49. Supra note 20.
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the mortgagee. Sound management would, in fact, vitiate the argument
that the vessel was unseaworthy and any creditor seeking to recover pre-
paid freights would, therefore, have to sue in contract and be forced to
settle for a smaller share of the proceeds. Even if the Morrisey decision
is simply viewed as one of a policy choice between two innocent parties,5°
the absence of the vessel owner's reckless acts would most likely be
enough for a court to then favor the ship mortgagee. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that ship mortgagees need not become unduly concerned about the
Morrisey decision, for the fact situation in itself is unique and affords a
possible basis for future distinction. If any principle is to be extracted
from this case, it is not particularly a legal one, but simply that investors
in the ship mortgage market primarily need to be more selective in their
investments, that shipowners primarily need to exercise better financial
methods, and that shippers primarily need to be more cautious before
agreeing to pre-pay freight charges.
Joseph A. Murphy
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Congress, by appropriate legislation, may have
the power to punish private conspiracies that interfere with fourteenth
amendment rights.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
In a Federal indictment growing out of the murder of Negro Educator
Lemuel Penn on a Georgia highway, the prosecution alleged a conspiracy
by the six defendants to deprive Negro citizens of the free exercise and
enjoyment of "the right to the equal utilization, without discrimination
upon the basis of race, of public facilities in the vicinity of Athens,
Georgia, owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of the State of
Georgia or any subdivision thereof."' Such alleged deprivation was said
to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment; 2 and of 18 U.S.C. § 241, which provides in part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or because of his not having exercised the
50. Admiralty can be viewed quite often in this regard. For example, the Supreme
Court seems to have decided Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), on this
basis. See also, Comment, 9 VI=a. L. REv. supra note 29.
1. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753 (1966). Paragraph two of the indictment.
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." [Emphasis added.]
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